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Abstract
This paper uses a structural model to understand, predict, and evaluate the impact
of an exogenous microcredit intervention program, the Thai Million Baht Village Fund
program. We model household decisions in the face of borrowing constraints, income
uncertainty, and high-yield indivisible investment opportunities. After estimation of
parameters using pre-program data, we evaluate the model's ability to predict and
interpret the impact of the village fund intervention. Simulated predictions from
the model mirror actual data in reproducing a greater increase in consumption than
credit, which is interpreted as evidence of credit contraints. A cost-benefit analysis
using the model indicates that some households value the program much more than
its per household cost, but overall the program costs 20 percent more than the sum
of these benefits.
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1 Introduction ^ = r
This paper uses a structural model to understand, predict, and evaluate the impact of
an exogenous microcredit intervention program, the Thai Million Baht Village Fund pro-
gram. Understanding and evaluating microfinance interventions, especially such a large
scale government program, is a matter of great importance. Proponents of microfinance
argue that the unique policies of microfinance enable institutions to bring credit and sav-
ings services to underdeveloped areas and to people with otherwise insufficient or no access
to formal financial systems. The hope and claim is that the provision of saving and credit
is both effective in fighting poverty and more financially viable than other means, while
detractors point to high default rates, reliance on (implicit and explicit) subsidies, and
the lack of hard evidence of their impacts on households. The few efforts to evaluate the
impacts of microfinance institutions using reduced form methods and plausibly exogenous
data have produced mixed and even contradictory results.' To our knowledge, this is the
first structural attempt to model and evaluate the impact of microfinance. Three key ad-
vantages of the structural approach are the potential for quantitative interpretation of the
data, counterfactual policy/out of sample prediction, and well-defined normative program
evaluation.
The Thai Million Baht Village fund program is one of the largest scale government
microfinance initiatives of its kind.^ Started in 2001, the program involved the transfer of
one miUion baht to each of the nearly 80,000 villages in Thailand to start village banks that
are run by a committee of villagers and lend to village members. The transfers themselves
'Pitt and Khandker (1998), Pitt et al (2003), Morduch (1998), Coleman (1999), Gertler, Levine and
Moretti (2003), and Karlan and Zinman (2006) are examples. Kaboski and Townsend (2003) estimates
positive impacts of microfinance in Thailand using non-experimental data.
^The Thai program involves approximatel}' $1.8 billion in initial funds. This injection of credit into
the rural sector is much smaller than Brazilian experience in the 1970s, which saw a growth in credit from
about S2 billion in 1970 to $20.5 billion in 1979. However, in terms of a government program implemented
through village institutions and using micro-lending techniques, the only comparable government program
in terms of scale would be Indonesia's KUPEDES village bank program, which was started in 1984 at a
cost of $20 million and supplemented by an additional $107 million in 1987. (World Bank, 1996)
sum to about 1.5 percent of Thai GDP and substantially increased available credit. We
study a panel of 960 households from sixty-four rural Thai villages in the Townsend Thai
Survey (Townsend et al, 1997). In these villages, funds were founded between the 2001 and
2002 survey years, and village fund loans amounted to eighty percent of new short-term
loans and one third of total short-term credit in the 2002 data. If we count village funds
as part of the formal sector, participation in the formal credit sector jumps from 60 to 80
percent.
We view this injection of credit, an initiative of (then newly-elected, now) former Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, as a quasi-experiment that produced exogenous variation
over time and across villages. The program was unanticipated and rapidly introduced.
More importantly, the total amount of funding given to each village was the same (one
million baht) regardless of the number of households in the village. Although village size
shows considerable variation within the rural regions we study, villages are administrative
geopolitical units and are often subdivided or joined for administrative or political purposes.
Indeed, using GIS maps, we have verified that village size patterns are not related to
underlying geographic features and vary from year to year in biannual data. Hence, there
are a priori grounds for believing that this variation and the magnitude of the per capita
intervention is exogenous with respect to the relevant variables.
Our companion paper, Kaboski and Townsend (2008), examines the exogeneity and
impacts of the program using a reduced form regression approach. We show indeed that
village size is not significantly related to pre-existing differences (in levels or trends) in
credit market or relevant outcome variables.'^ After the program, however, many outcome
variables are strongly related to village size, and many of these are puzzling without an
explicit theory of credit-constrained behavior. In particular, households increased their
borrowing and their consumption roughly one for one with each dollar put into the funds.
A perfect credit model, such as a permanent income model, would have trouble explaining
the large increase in borrowing, since reported interest rates on borrowing did not fall
This companion paper also uses reduced form analyses to examine impacts in greater detail and look
for general equilibrium effects on wages and interest rates.
as a result of the program. Similarly, even if households treated loans as a shock to
income rather than a loan, they would only consume the interest of the shock (roughly
seven percent) perpetually. Moreover, households were not initially more likely in default
after the program was introduced, despite the increase in borrowing. Finally, household
investment is an important aspect of household behavior. We observe increase in the
frequency of investment, however, oddly impacts of the program on the level of investment
were difficult to discern. This is a priori puzzling in a model with divisible investment, if
credit constraints are deemed to plaj' an important role. ,; > -
The structural model we develop in this paper here sheds light on many of these findings.
Gi^'en the prevalence of income shocks that are not fully insured in these villages (see Chi-
appori et al., 2008), we start with a standard precautionary savings model (e.g., Aiyagari,
1994, Carroll, 1997, Deaton, 1991). We then add important features designed to capture
other key aspects of the economic environment and household behavior in the pre-program
data. In particular, short-term borrowing exists but is limited, and so we naturally allow
borrowing but only up to limits. Similarly, default exists in equilibrium, as does renego-
tiation of payment terms, and so our model incorporates default. Finally, investment is
relatively infrequent in the data but is sizable when it occurs. To capture this lumpiness,
we allow households to make investments in indivisible, illiquid, high yield projects whose
size follows an unobserved stochastic process.^ Finalty, income growth is high but variable,
averaging 7 percent but varying greatly over households, even after controlling for life cycle
trends. Allowing for growth requires writing a model that is homogeneous in the permanent
component of income, so that a suitably normalized version attains a steady state solution,
gi\dng us value functions and time-invariant (normalized) policy functions. These features
are not only central features of the data, but central to the evaluation of microfinance.
Our approach is indeed to estimate the model in an attempt to closely mimic relevant
features of the pre-program data by matching income growth volatility, default rates, sav-
''An important literature in development has examined the interaction between financial constraints
and indivisible investments. See, for example, Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Gine
and Townsend (2001), Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt (2001), and Owen and Weil (1997).
ing/borrowing rates, and consumption and investment behavior of people with different
levels of observed income and hquid assets. We estimate 11 parameters using a Method of
Simulated Moments (MSM) across 16 moment conditions. The model broadly reproduces
many important features of the data, closely matching consumption and investment lev-
els, and investment and default probabilities. Nonetheless, two features of the model are
less successful, and the overidentifying restrictions of the model are rejected. The income
process of the model has trouble replicating the variance in the data, which is affected by
the Thai financial crisis in the middle of our pre-intervention data, and the borrowing and
lending rates differ in the data but are assumed equal in the model. Using the model to
match year-to-year fluctuations is also difficult.
For our purposes, however, a more relevant test of the usefulness of the pre-program-
estimated model is its ability to predict responses to an increase in available credit, namely
the village fund intervention. Methodologically, we model the microfinance intervention as
an introduction of a borrowing/lending technology that relaxes household borrowing limits.
These limits are relaxed differentially across villages in order to induce an additional one
million baht of short-term credit in each village; hence, small villages get larger reductions
of their borrowing constraint.
Given the relaxed borrowing limits, we simulate the model with the stochastic income
process to create 500 artificial datasets of the same size as the actual Thai panel. We then
examine whether the model can reproduce the above impact estimates. The model does
remarkably well. In particular, it predicts an average response in consumption that is close
to the dollar-to-dollar response in the data. Similarly, the model reproduces the fact that
effects on average investment levels and investment probabilities are difficult to measure in
the data. .::.:, , ;, ",,.- V-
In the simulated data, however, these aggregate effects can be seen to mask consid-
erable heterogeneity across households, much of which we treat as unobservable to us as
econometricians. Increases in consumption come from roughly two groups. First, there are
hand-to-mouth consumers, who are constrained in their consumption either because they
have low current liquidity (income plus savings) or are using current (pre-program) liquid-
ity to finance lumpj^ investments. These constrained households use additional availability
of credit to finance current consumption. Second, households who are not constrained may
increase their consumption even without borrowing. They simply reduce their bufferstock
savings, which is less needed in the future given the increased availability of credit. Third,
for some households, increased credit induces them to invest in their high yield projects.
Some of these households may actually reduce their consumption, however, as they sup-
plement credit with reduced consumption in order to finance sizable indivisible projects.
(Again, the evidence we present for such behavior in the pre-intervention data is an impor-
tant motivation for modeling investment indivisibility.) Finally, for households who would
have defaulted without the program, available credit may simply be used to repay existing
loans and so have little effect on consumption or investment. Perhaps most surprising is
that these different types of households may all appear ex ante identical in terms of their
observables.
The model not only highlights this underlying heterogeneity, but also shows the quanti-
tative importance of these behaviors. Namely, the large increeise in consumption indicates
the relative importance of the first two types of households, both of whom increase their
consumption. Also, the estimated structural parameters capture the relatively low invest-
ment rates and large skew in investment sizes. Hence, overall investment relationships are
driven by a relatively few, large investments, and so very large samples are needed to ac-
curately measure effects on average investment. The model generates these effects but for
data that are larger than the actual Thai sample. Second and related, given the lumpiness
of projects, small amounts of credit are relatively unlikely to change investment decisions
on the large projects that drive aggregate investment.
We use the model and data for several other alternative analyses. First, we re-estimate
the model and borrov-nng constraint parameters using both (i.e., pooling) the pre- and
post-intervention data, and we verify that these estimates are quite similar to our baseline
estimates and calibrated borrowing constraints. Hence, the model we use to do predictions
is quite similar to a "best fit" model in the overall data. Second, we use the model to sim-
ulate long run predictions and show that measured impacts from reduced form regressions
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fall substantially with the number of years of post-treatment data and become statistically
insignificant. Third, we model a counterfactual policy in which the microfinance funds only
lend to households that invest in the period when they borrow. The use of fund per se is
not observable, but investment is. Such a policy has larger effects on investment than the
implemented policy but still not as large as the effect on consumption.
Finally, our normative evaluation compares the costs of the Million Baht program to the
costs of a direct transfer program that is equivalent in the sense of providing the same utility
benefit. The heterogeneity of households plays an important role, and indeed the welfare
benefits of the program vary substantially across households and villages. Essentially, there
are two major differences between the microfinance program and a well-directed transfer
program. First, the microfinance program is potentially less beneficial because households
face the interest costs of credit. In order to access liquidity, households borrow more, and
while they can always carry forward more debt into the future, they are left with larger
interest payments. Interest costs are particularly high for otherwise defaulting households,
whose debts is augmented to the more liberal borrowing limit, and so they bear higher
interest charges. On the other hand, the microfinance program is potentially more benefi-
cial than a direct transfer program because it can also provide more liquidity to those who
potentially have the highest marginal valuation of liquidity by lowering the borrowing con-
straint. Hence, the program is relatively more cost-effective for non-defaulting households
with urgent liquidity needs for consumption and investment. Quantitatively, given the
high level of default in the data and the high interest rate, the benefits (i.e., the equivalent
transfer) of the program are twenty percent less than the program costs, but this masks
this interesting variation among losers and gainers.
The paper contributes to several literatures. First, we add a structural modeling ap-
proach to a small literature that uses theory to test the importance of credit constraints in
developing countries (e.g., Banerjee and Duflo, 2002). Second, we contribute to an active
literature on consumption and liquidity constraints, and the bufferstock model, in partic-
ular. Studies with U.S. data have also found a high sensitivity of consumption to current
liquidity (e.g., Zeldes, 1989, Aaronson, Agarwal, and French, 2008), but we believe ours is
the first to study this response with quasi experimental data in a developing country. Third,
methodologically, we build on an existing literature that has used out-of-sample prediction,
and experiments in particular, to evaluate structural models (e.g., Lise et al., 2005a, Lise et
al., 2005b, Todd and Wolpin, 2006). Finally, we contribute to the literature on measuring
and interpreting treatment effects (e.g., Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil, 2004), which has
emphasized unobserved heterogeneity, non-linearity and time-varying impacts. We develop
an explicit behavioral model where all three play a role. ' -
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the
underlying economic environment, the Million Baht village fund intervention, and reviews
the facts from reduced form impact regressions that motivate the model. The model, and
resulting value and policy functions, are presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the data
and presents the GMM estimation procedure and resulting estimates. Section 5 simulates
the Million Baht intervention, performs policy counterfactuals, and presents the welfare
analysis. Section 6 concludes.
.
> -
2 Thai Million Baht Credit Intervention
The exogenous intervention that we consider is the founding of village-level microcredit
institutions by the Thai government, the Million Baht Fund program. Former Thai Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra implemented the program in Thailand in 2001, shortly after
winning election. One million baht (about $24,000) was distributed to each of the 77,000
villages in Thailand to found self-sustaining village microfinance banks. Every village,
whether poor or wealthy, urban^ or rural was eligible to receive the funds. The size of the
transfers alone, about $1.8 billion, amounts to about 1.5 percent of GDP in 2001.
The design and organization of the funds were intended to allow all existing villagers
equal access to loans through competitive application and loan evaluation handled at the
^The village (moo ban) is an official political unit in Thailand, the smallest such unit, and is under the
sub-district (tambon), district (amphoe), and province (changwat) levels. Thus, "villages" can be thought
of as just small communities of households that exist in both urban and rural areas.
village level. For these rural villages, funds were disbursed to and held at the Thai Bank
of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives, and funds could only be withdrawn with a
withdrawal slip from the village fund committee. Village fund committees were relatively
large (consisting of 9-15 members) and representative (e.g., half women, no more than one
member per household) with short, two year terms. Residence in the village was the only
official eligibility requirement for membership, and so although migrating villagers or new-
comers would likely not receive loans, there was no official targeting of any sub-population
within villages. Loans were uncollateralized, though most funds required guarantors. Re-
payment rates were quite high; less than three percent of funds lent to households in the
first year of the program were 90 days behind by the end of the second year. Indeed, based
on the household level data, ten percent more credit was given out in the second year than
in the first, presumably partially reflecting repaid interest plus principal. There were no
firm rules regarding the use of funds, but reasons for borrowing, ability to repay, and the
need for funds were the three most common loan criteria used. Indeed many households
were openly granted loans for consumption. The funds make short-term loans - the vast
majority of lending is annual - with an average nominal interest rate of seven percent.
This was about a five percent real interest rate in 2001, and about five percent above the
average money market rate in Bangkok.^
2,1 Quasi-Experimental Design of the Program
As described in the introduction, the program design was beneficial for research in two
ways. First, it arose from a quick election, after the Thai parliament was dissolved in
November, 2000, and was rapidly implemented in 2001. None of the funds had been
founded by our 2001 (May) survey date, but by our 2002 survey, each of our 64 villages
had received and lent funds, lending 950,000 baht on average.'' Households would not have
^More details of the funds and program are presented in Kaboski and Townsend (2008).
^We know the precise month that the funds were received, which varies across villages. This month was
uncorrelated with the amount of credit disbursed, but may be an additional source of error in predicting
the impacts of credit. . , ,. . ,< .:. ., ,,- ,, ; .-.^
anticipated the program in earlier years. We therefore model the program as a surprise.
Second, the same amount was given to each village, regardless of the size, so villages with
fewer households received more funding per household. Regressions below report a highly
significant relationship between household's credit from a village fund and inverse village
size in 2002 after the program.
There are strong a priori reasons for expecting variation in inverse village size to be fairly
exogenous with respect to important variables of interest. First, villages are geopolitical
units, and villages are divided or merged based on fairly arbitrary redistricting. Second,
because inverse village size is the variable of interest, the most important variation comes
from a comparison among small villages (e.g., between 50 and 250 households). That is, our
analysis is not based on comparing urban areas with rural areas, and indeed, the reduced
form results below are robust to the exclusion of the few villages outside of this 50-250
range.* Third, no obvious geographic correlates with village size are discernible from GIS
plots of village size in our area of study (Kaboski and Townsend, 2008).
2.2 Reduced Form Impacts
In the analysis that follows we view the relationships between outcome measures and village
size as driven by the program itself, and not the result of pre-existing differences in levels
or trends. Indeed, this is established in depth by Kaboski and Townsend (2008), which
presents reduced form regressions. Using seven years of data (1997-2003, so that t=6 is
the first post-program year, 2002) , we run a first-stage regression to predict village fund
**Thus, an}' populist bias toward rural areas and against Bangkok is not likely to contaminate our
analysis. Other policies initiated by Thaksin included the "30 Baht Health Plan" (which set a price control
at 30 baht per medical visit), and "One Tambon-One Product" (a marketing policy for local products).
Neither were operated at the village level, since the former is an individual level program while the latter
is at the tambon (sub-district) level.
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credit of household n in year t, VFCRn,t'
._„„ Y- 1,000,000 ^ ^, 1,000,000
j^7 # ^^^ ^'^ Village^ t # HHs in village^ ^
+lVFCR^nt + (^VFCR,t + dvFCR,n + ^VFCR.nt
Here the crucial instrument is inverse village size in the post-intervention years (the
latter captured by the indicator function It=j), ^nt is a vector of demographic household
controls, and Ovfcrx ^nd 9vFCR,n are time and household specific-fixed effectsm respec-
tively. Second stage outcome equations in levels and differences are of the form:
# HHs m village^ (
+'yz^rit + 9z,t + 9z,n + £Z,nt
Here Znt represents an outcome variable of interest for household n in year t, and 6z,t and
dz,n are time and household specific-fixed effects respectively. Although there is hetero-
geneity across households and non-linearity in the impact of credit, dj ^ captures (a linear
approximation of) the relationship between the average impact of a dollar of credit on the
outcome of Znt
The estimates of Q2,z capture any other relationship between village size and credit
or outcome variables that exists before the program years, after controlling for household
and time fixed effects. Using these and other specifications, we analyze a wide range of
outcome variables Znt, including credit disaggregated by source and stated use, interest
rates, income, investment, savings, lending, and assets. ° Using a conservative ten percent
level of significance, the Q2,z estimates are only significant in 3 of the 37 regressions, which is
below the rate of Type 1 errors expected. Another robustness check includes an additional
control in equations (1) and (2), „ „J' . ' .,, * i, which allows for linear-time trends to^
^ ' ^ '' # HHs in village^ ( '
vary by inverse village size. These coefficients are significant in only 1 of 37 regressions.^"
"An additional specification that we consider included a geographic control variable that captures the
average size of neighboring villages.
'°Over the full sample, smaller villages were associated with higher levels of short-term credit where
fertilizer was the stated reason for borrowing, and higher fractions of income from rice and other crops.
They were also associated with higher growth in the fraction of income coming from wages.
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Thus, our regressions do not seem to sufiFer from pre-existing differences in levels or trends
associated with inverse village size.
The regressions produce several interesting "impact" estimates aiz as reported in detail
in our companion paper, Kaboski and Townsend (2008).^^ With regard to credit, the
program expanded village fund credit roughly one for one, with the coefficient aiypcR
close to one. Second, total credit overall appears to have had a similar expansion, with an
ai^z i^ear one and there is no evidence of crowding out in the credit market. Finally, the
expansion did not occur through a reduction in interest rates. Indeed the ai^z is positive,
though small for interest rates.
Household consumption was obviously and significantly affected by the program, with
a di_2 point estimate near one. The higher level of consumption was driven by non-durable
consumption and services, rather than durable goods. While the frequency of agricultural
investments did increase mildly, total investment showed no significant response to the
program. The frequency of households in default increased mildly in the second year,
but default rates remained less than 15 percent of loans. Asset levels (including savings)
declined in response to the program, while income growth increased weakly. ^^
Together, these results are puzzling. In a perfect credit, permanent income model, with
no changes in prices, unsubsidized credit should have no effect, while subsidized credit would
simply have an income effect. If credit did not need to be repaid, this income effect would be
bounded above by the amount of credit injected. Yet repayment rates were actually quite
high, with only 3 percent of village fund credit in default in the last year of the survey. But
again, even if credit were not repaid, an income effect would produce at most a coefficient
of the market interest rate (less than 0.07), i.e., the household would keep the principle of
'^The sample in Kaboski and Townsend (2008) varies slightly from the sample in this paper. Here we
necessarily exclude 118 households who did not have complete set of data for all seven years. To avoid
confusion, we do not report the actual Kaboski and Townsend (2008) estimates here.
^^Wage income also increased in response to the shock, which is a focus of Kaboski and Townsend (2008).
The increase is quite small relative to the increase in consumption, however, and so this has little promise
in explaining the puzzles. We abstract from general equilibrium effects on the wage and interest rate in
the model we present.
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the one-time wealth shock and consume the interest. The fact that households appear to
have simply increased their consumption by the value of the funds lent is therefore puzzling.
Given the positive level of observed investment, the lack of a response to investment might
point to well-functioning credit markets, but the large response of credit and consumption
indicate the opposite. Thus, the coefficients overall require a theoretical and quantitative
explanation.
2.3 Underlying Environment
Growth, savings/credit, default, and investment are key features in the Thai villages during
the pre-intervention period (as well as afterward). Households income growth averages 7
percent over the panel, but both income levels and growth rates are stochastic. Savings and
credit are important buffers against income shocks (Samphantharak and Townsend, 2008),
but credit is limited (Puentes, 2008). Income shocks are neither fully insured nor fully
smoothed (Chiappori et al, 2008), and Karaivanov and Townsend (2008) conclude that
savings and borrowing models and savings only models fit the data better than alternative
mechanism design models. High income households appear to have access to greater credit.
That is, among borrowing households, regressions of log short-term credit on log current
income yield a coefficient of 0.32 (std. err. =0.02).
Related, default occurs in equilibrium, and appears to be one way of smoothing against
shocks. In any given year, 19 percent of households are over three months behind in their
payments on short-term (less than on year) debts. Default is negatively related to current
income, but household consumption is substantial during periods of default, averaging 164
percent of current income, and positively related to income. Using only years of default,
regressions of log consumption on log income yield a coefficient of regression of 0.41 (std.
error=0.03).
Finally, investment plays an important role in the data, averaging 10 percent of house-
hold's income. It is lumpy, however. On average only 12 percent of households invest in any
given year. Investment is large in years when investment occurs and highly skewed with a
13
mean of 79 percent of total income and a median of 15 percent. Both the size of investment
and tiie frequency of investment are strongly positively associated with income, but high
income households still invest infrequently. The top income tercile invest more often than
poorer households but still only 22 percent of the time. Related, investment is not concen-
trated among the same households each year. If the average probability of investing (0.12)
were independent across years and households, one would predict that (1 — 0.88^ =)47 per-
cent of households would invest at least once over the five years of pre-intervention data.
This is quite close to the 42 percent that is observed.
The next section develops a model broadly consistent with this underlying environment.
3 Model ' '
:
We address these key features of the data by developing a model of a household facing
permanent and transitory income shocks and making decisions about consumption, low
3'ield liquid savings, high yield illiquid investment and default. In order to allow for growth,
tractability requires that we make strong functional form assumptions. In particular, the
problem is written so that all constraints are linear in the permanent component of income,
so that the value function and policy functions can all be normalized by permanent income.
We do this to attain a stationary, recursive problem.
3.1 Sequential Problem
At t
-I- 1, liquid wealth Lt+i includes the principle and interest on liquid savings from the
pre\'ious period (1 -I- r) St (negative for borrowing) and current realized income ^f+i:
'
- L,+i=y,+i + 5,(l + r) (3)
Following the literature on precautionary savings (e.g., Zeldes, 1989, Carroll, 1997, Gourin-
chas and Parker, 2001), current income Yt+i consists of a permanent component of income
Pt+i and a transitory one-period shock, Ut+\, additive in logs:
Y,+, = Pt+^Ut,+^
_
'
(4)
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We follow the same literature in modeling an exogenous component of permanent income
that follows a random walk (again in logs) based on shock Nt with drift G, but our addition
in this paper is to allow for permanent income to also be increased endogenously through
investment. Investment is indivisible - the household makes a choice £)/_f G {0, 1} of
whether to undertake a lumpy investment project of size 7^* or to not invest at all. In sum,
Pt+i = P,G7Vt+i + RDi^j; (5)
Investment is also illiquid and irreversible, but again it increases permanent income, at a
rate R, higher than the interest rate on liquid savings, r, and sufficiently high to induce
investment for households with high enough liquidity. Having investment increase the
permanent component of future income simplifies the model by allowing us to track only
Pt rather than multiple potential capital stocks.^'' While we have endogenized an important
element of the income process, we abstract from potentially endogenous decisions such as
labor supply, and the linearity in R abstracts from any diminishing returns that would
follow from a non-linear production function.
Project size is stochastic, governed by an exogenous shock i* and proportional to the
permanent component of income: ,_
.
-: Il-^lPt
'
y ^ •" ^ (6)
We assume that investment opportunities I^ increase with permanent income Pt. This
is consistent with the empirical literature, where investment is typically scaled by size, i.e.,
large firms invest higher amounts. It also ensures that high permanent income alone will
not automatically eliminate the role of credit constraints and lumpiness in investment by
This approach ignores many issues of investment "portfolio" decisions and risk diversification. Still,
the lumpy investment does capture the important portfolio decision between a riskless, low yield, liquid
asset and a risky, illiquid asset, which is already beyond what is studied in a standard bufferstock model.
We can show this by defining At = Pt/R and using (3), (4), (5), and (9) to write:
At + St--{RUt + GNt)At-i+St-i{l+r)-Ct] - .. /; .
Physical assets At pay a stochastic gross return of {RUi + GNt), while liquid savings pay a fixed return
of (1 +r). -',
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allowing for investment every period. We do not observe this in the data, as discussed in
the previous section. •
Liquid savings can be negative, but borrov/ing is bounded by a limit which is a multiple
s of the permanent component of income. That is, when s is negative, borrowing is allowed,
and the more negative it is, the more can be borrowed. This is the key parameter that we
calibrate to the intervention: . i \
,
.
-
-StysPt __: .. : . (7)
For the purposes of this partial equilibrium analysis, this borrowing constraint is exogenous.
It is not a natural borroAving constraint as in Aiyagari (1994) and therefore somewhat ad
hoc, but such a constraint can arise endogenously in models with limited commitment
(see Wright, 2002) or where lenders have rights to garnish a fraction of future wages (e.g.,
Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2008). Most importantly, it allows for default (see below),
which is observed in the data and of central interest to microfinance interventions.
In period 0, the household begins with a potential investment project of size /q, a
permanent component of income Pq, and liquid wealth Lq all as initial conditions. The
household's problem is to maximize expected discounted utility by choosing a sequence of
consumption Ct > 0, savings St, and decisions Dj^t £ {0, 1} of whether or not to invest:
V{Lo,Io,Pq;s) = max Eq
{Ct>0}
V^ 0^^
1-p
^-^t=0 1-/3
s.t. eq. (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8)
Ct + St-VDi^ti; < U
"
. (9)
The expectation is taken over sequences of permanent income shocks Nt, transitory
income shocks [/(, and investment size shocks i*. These shocks are each i.i.d. and orthogonal
to one another: ' -
• Nt is random walk shock to permanent income. In A^t ^ A''(0, o"^).
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• [/f is a temporary (one period) income shock. Ut = In [/j ~ A^(0, a^).
• i* is project size (relative to permanent income). Ini* ~ N{fj,^,af)
If s < 0, an agent with debt, i.e., St-\ < 0, and a sufficiently low income shock may
need to default. That is, with Lt = Yt + 5'/-i(l + r), even with zero consumption and
investment, equation (9) could imply St < sPt. Essentially, given (7), a bad enough shock
to permanent income (i.e., a low Nt) can produce a "margin call" on credit that exceeds
current liquidity.
In this case, we assume default allows for a minimum consumption level that is pro-
portional to permanent income {cPt). Defining the default indicator, Ddef,t S {0,1}, this
condition for default is expressed:
1, if (s + c)Pf < L(
D<ieu= ;
'-
(10)
0, otherwise
and the defaulting household's policy for the period becomes:
' ' Ct =^ cPt
-
J. • •; • ^
'
St = sPt .':'. ^-V: •'
This completes the model. The above modeling assumptions are strong and not without
costs. Still, as we have seen, they are motivated by the data, and they do have analyt-
ical benefits beyond allowing us to deal easily with growth. First, the model is simple
and has limited heterogeneity, but consequently has a low dimension, tractable state space
{L, /*, P} and parameter space {r, a^, cr^, G, c, /?, p, /ij, ai, s}. Hence, the role of each state
and parameter can be more easily understood. Furthermore, the linearity of the constraints
in Pt reduces the dimensionality of the state space to two, which allows for graphical repre-
sentation of policy functions (in Section 5.2). The next subsection derives the normalized,
recursive representation.^'*
Conditions for the equivalence of the recursive and sequential problems and existence of the steady
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3.2 Normalized and Recursive Problem
Above, we have explicitly emphasized the value function's dependence on s, since this will
be the parameter of most interest in considering the microfinance intervention in Section 5.
We drop this emphasis in the simplifying notation that follows. Using lower case variables
to indicate variables normalized^" by permanent income, the recursive problem becomes:
v{l,i*) = max^^+PElip'y-'vil^i*')] ''
. (11)
c,s',di 1 — p L J
:;
'
S.t.
"
-: -.
,
-;
,
\.. A : c + s + dii*<l from (9) .. • (12)
(p : s>s from (7) , (13)
,
"
, p' = GN' + Rd,i* from (5) (14)
.:
i> ^ y' + £ii±!:l from (3) (15)
P
y = U' from (4) - - • (16)
We further simplify by substituting /' and y' into the continuation value using (15) and
(16), and substituting out s using the liquidity budget constraint (12), which will hold with
state are straightforward extensions of conditions given in Alvarez and Stokey (1998) and Carroll (2004).
In particular, for p < 1, G and RE [i'\ must be sufficiently bounded.
'^Here the decision whether to invest d, is not a normalized variable and is in fact identical to I?, in the
earlier problem. We have denoted it in lower case to emphasize that it will depend only on the normalized
states I and i*. : >.
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equality, to yield:
v{l, i*
.i-p
,
,.\-p I rj, ^ {I + r)il - c - dji*)
{p) ''v[U +
V
max
c, di 1 — p
+15E
s.t.
{I — c — dii*) > s
GN' + Rd!i*
,^ (17)
(18)
(19)
The normalized form of the problem has two advantages. First, it lowers the dimen-
sionality of the state variable to two. Second, it allows the problem to have a steady state
solution. Using * to signify optimal decision rules, the necessary conditions for optimal
consumption c« and investment decisions dj^ are:^^
ic)
-p
_ P{l + r)E ( 'yp^^m' I
(l + ^)(^-^* -dj,i*)
.,,^
p'
.i-p
.i-p
i-p
+ PE
+ PE ip'
'\i-p,
v{U' +
iP
'\i-p,
V U' +
{1 + r)(l - c, - djX)
..,
',
'^
:i + r)[/-c., -(l -d;.)r]
.,,
+
>
(20)
P'
(21)
Equation (20) is the usual credit constrained Euler equation. The constraint (f) is only
non-zero when the credit constraint (18) binds, i.e., c, — I — s — dj^i* Equation (21)
ensures that the value given the optimal investment decision c?/,, exceeds the maximum
value given the alternative, 1 — d/., c^,^, indicates the optimal consumption under this
alternative investment decision (i.e., c*, satisfies the analog to (20) for 1 — d/,).
In practice, the value function and optimal policy functions must be solved numerically,
and indeed the indivisible investment decision complicates the computation.^^
^^ Although the value function is kinked, it is differentiable almost everywhere, and the smooth expecta-
tion removes any kink in the continuation value.
^^Details of the computational approach and codes are available from the authors upon request.
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Figure 1 presents a three-dimensional graph of a computed value function. The fiat
portion at very low levels of liquidity / comes from the minimum consumption and default
option. The dark line highlights a groove going through the middle of the value function
surfaces along the critical values at which households first decide to invest in the lumpy
project. Naturally, these threshold levels of liquidity are increasing in the size of the project.
The slope of the value function with respect to / increases at this point because the marginal
utility of consumption increases at the point of investment. ^^ Consumption actually falls
as liquidity increases beyond this threshold.
Figure 2, panel A illustrates this more clearly by showing a cross-section of the optimal
consumption policy as a function of normalized liquidity for a given value of i*. At the
lowest values, households are in default. At low values of liquidity, no investment is made,
households consume as much as possible given the borrowing constraint, and hence the
borrowing constraint holds with equality. At higher liquidity levels, this constraint is no
longer binding as savings levels s exceed the lower bound s. At some crucial level of liquidity
U, the household chooses to invest in the lumpy project, at which point consumption falls
and the marginal propensity to consume out of additional liquidity increases. Although not
pictured, for some parameter values (e.g., very high i?), the borrowing constraint can again
hold with equality, and marginal increases in liquidity are used for purely for consumption.^^
Panel B of Figure 2 shows the effect of a surprise permanent decrease in s on the
'^ Given the convex kink in the value function, households at or near the kink would benefit from lotteries,
which we rule out consistent with the idea that borrowing and lending subject to limits is the only form
of intermediation.
"'Using a bufTerstock model, Zeldes (1989) derived reduced form equations for consumption growth,
and found that consumption growth was significantly related to current income, but only for low wealth
households, interpreted as evidence of credit constraints. We run similar consumption growth equations
that also contain investment eis an explanatory variable:
In Cn,(+ i/Cn,( = -Y„,(/?i + /^a^'n.t + /?3-^n,( + £n,t
For the low wealth sample, we find significant estimates /32 < and /3^ > 0, which is consistent with the
prediction of investment lowering current consumption (thereby raising future consumption growth).
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optimal consumption policy for the same given value of i*. Consumption increases for
liquidity levels in every region, except for the region that is induced into investing by more
access to borrowing.
An additional interesting prediction of the model is that for a given level of borrowing
{st < 0), a household that invests {dj^t = 1) has a lower probability of default next period.
Conditional on investing, the default probabihty is further decreasing in the size of invest-
ment. Thus, other things equal borrowing to invest leads to less default than borrowing
to consume because investment increases future income and therefore ability to repay. The
maximum amount of debt that can be carried over into next period (i.e., —sPt) is propor-
tionate to permanent income. Because investment increases permanent income, it increases
the borrowing limit next period, and therefore reduces the probabihty of a "margin call"
on outstanding debt.
One can see this formally by substituting the definitions of liquidity (3) and income
(4), and the law of motion for permanent income (5) into the condition for default (10) to
yield:
St
E{Ddeu+i\St,Pt,Dj^t,i:) = Pr Ut+i < (s + c)- (22)
{PtNt+,G + RDj,tin
Since St is negative and R is positive, the right-hand side of the inequality is decreasing in
both Dj^t and /*. Since both Nt+i and Ut+i are independent of investment, the probability
is therefore decreasing in Djj and I^.
4 Estimation
This section addresses the data used and then the estimation approach. The model is quite
parsimonious with a total of 11 parameters. Due to poor identification, we calibrate the
return on investment parameter, R, using a separate data source. After adding classical
measurement error on income with log variance ge , we estimate the remaining parameters,
9 — {r,af^,au,crE,G,c,/3,p,iJ.^,ai,s} via GMM using the optimal weighting matrix. This
21
estimation is performed using five years (1997-2001) of pre-intervention data, so that t = 1
corresponds to the year 1997. :;,:-:.
,
., ,'..:
4.1 Data y-'"/: :--' ' -/^
.
''",•;
';• ' '..::--..^-
Tlie data come from the Townsend Tliai data project, an ongoing panel dataset of a strat-
ified, clustered, random sample of institutions (256 in 2002), households (960 each year,
715 with complete data in the pre-experiment balanced panel used for estimation, and 700
in 2002 and 2003, respectively, which are used to evaluate the model's prediction), and key
informants for the village (64, one in each village). The data are collected from sixty-four
villages in four provinces: Buriram and Srisaket in the Northeast region, and Lopburi and
Chachoengsao in the Central region. The components used in this study include detailed
data from households and household businesses on their consumption, income, investment,
credit, liquid assets and the interest income from these assets, as well as village population
data from the village key informants. All data has been deflated using the Thai consumer
price index to the middle of the pre-experiment data, 1999.
The measure of household consumption we use (denoted Cn,t for household n at time
t) is calculated using detailed data on monthly expenditure data for thirteen key items,
and scaled up using weights derived from the Thai Socioeconomic Survey.^° In addition, we
include household durables in consumption, though durables play no role in the observed
increases in consumption. The measure of investment (/n,t) we use is total farm and business
investments, including livestock and shrimp/fish farm purchases.
We impute default each year for households who report one or more loans due in the
previous 15 months that are outstanding at least three months. Note that (1) this includes
all loans, and not just short-term, since any (non-voluntary) default indicates a lack of
available liquidity, and (2) due dates are based on the original terms of the loan, since
changes in duration are generally a result of default.-^ This only approximates default in
'^"The tildes represent raw data which will be normalized in Section 4.3.1.
"^According to this definition, default probability is about 19 percent, but alternative definitions can
produce different results. The probability for short-term loan alone is just 12 percent, for example. On
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the model, and it may underestimate default because of underreporting, but overestimate
default as defined in the model or to the extent that late loans are eventually repaid.
The income measure we use (denoted Yn,t) includes all agricultural, wage, business and
financial income (net of agricultural and business expenses) but excludes interest income
on liquid assets such as savings deposits as in the model. Our savings measure (Sn^t)
includes not only savings deposits in formal and semi-formal financial institutions, but also
the value of rice holdings in the household. Cash holdings are unfortunately not available.
The measure of liquid credit (CRn^t) is short-term credit with loan durations of one year or
less. The measurement of interest income on liquid savings {EARNED_INTn^t) is interest
income in year t on savings in formal and semi-formal institutions. The interest owed on
credit {OWED_INT„^t) is the reported interest owed on short-term credit.
"WTiile the data is high quality and detailed, measurement error is an important concern.
Net income measures are complicated when expenditures and corresponding income do not
coincide in the same year, for example. If income is measured with error, the amount of true
income fluctuations will be overstated in the data, and household decisions may appear to
be less closely tied to transitory income shocks, hence credit constraints may not appear to
be important. Consumption and investment may also suffer from measurement error, but
classical measurement error will just add additional variation to these endogenous variables
will not effect the moments, only the weighting matrix. A major source of measurement
error for interest is that savings and borrowing may fluctuate within the year, so that
the annual flow of both earned and paid interest may not accurately reflect interest on
the end-of-year stocks contained in the data. This measurement error will assist in the
estimation.
Table 1 presents key summary statistics for the data.
the other hand, relabeling all loans from non-family sources that have no duration data whatsoever as in
default yields a default probability of 23 percent. Our results for consumption and default hold for the
higher rates of default.
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4.1.1 Adjusting the Data for Demographic and CycUcal Variation
The model is of infinitely lived dynasties that are heterogeneous only in their liquidity,
permanent income, and potential investment. That is, in the model, the exogenous sources
of variation among households come from given differences in initial liquidity or perma-
nent income, and histories of shocks to permanent income, transitory income, and project
size. Clearly, the data, however, contain important variation due to heterogeneity in
household composition, business cycle and regional variation, and unmodeled aspects of
unobserved household heterogeneity. Ignoring these sources of variation would be prob-
lematic. For household composition, to the extent that changes in household composition
are predictable, the variance in income changes may not be capturing uncertainty but also
predictable changes in household composition. Likewise, consumption variation may not
be capturing household responses to income shocks but rather predictable responses to
changes in household composition. Failure to account for this would likely exaggerate both
the size of income shocks and the response of household consumption to these shocks. In
the data, the business cycle (notably the financial crisis in 1997 and subsequent recovery)
also plays an important role in household behavior, investment and savings behavior in
particular. Although our post-program analysis will focus on the across-village differential
impacts of the village fund program, and not merely the time-changes, we do not want to
confound the impacts with business cycle movements. Finally, differences in consumption,
for example, across households may tell us less about past and current income shocks, and
more about unobserved differences in preferences or consumption needs.
We therefore follow Gourinchas and Parker (2002) in removing the business cycle and
household composition variation from the data. In particular, we run linear regressions of
log income, log consumption, and liquidity over income. (We do not take logs of liquiditj',
since it takes both positive and negative values, but instead normalize by income so that
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high values do not carry disproportionate weight.)'- The estimated equations are:
In Yn,t = 7vX„,t + 9Y,j,t + eY,n,t
Ln,t/yn,t = Jl'^n.t + d L,j,t + &L,n,t
In Cn,t = Tc^n.t + ^CJ,( + ec,n,f
In Dn,t = lD^n,t + dD„j,t + eD,n,t
where X„,( is a vector of household composition variables (i.e., number of adult males,
number of adult females, number of children, male head of household dummy, linear and
squared terms of age of head of household, years education of head of household, and a
household-specific fixed effect) for household n at time t and 9 j^t is a time f-specific effect
that varies by region j and captures the business cycle. These regressions are run using
only the pre-program data, 1997-2001, which ensures that we do filter out the effects of the
program itself. Unfortunately, the pre-program, time-specific effects cannot be extrapolated
for the post-program data, so we rely on across village, within-year variation to evaluate
the model's predictions. The R"^ values for the four regressions are 0.63, 0.34, 0.76, and
0.31, respectively, so the regressions are indeed accounting for a great deal of heterogeneity
and variation.
For the full sample, 1997-2003, we construct the adjusted data for a household with
mean values of the explanatory variables (X and 6,j) using the estimated coefficients and
residuals: •
.
.
lny„t = %-X + ey^j+gy{t- 1999) + eY,n,t '
,
' InCnt = 7cX + ^cj + 5c(i - 1999) + ec,„,t '' : '
• ;',
,; Dnt = 1d^ + ^D,j + eD,n,t , ' ,.
.
where Qy and Qc are the average growth rates of the trending variables, income and con-
sumption, respectively, in the pre-program data. Next, we use a multiplicative scaling
^^As noted before, 79 of the original 960 households realized negative net income at some point in the
pre-intervention sample. The model yields only positive income, and so these households were dropped.
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term to ensure that average income, liquidity ratios, consumption, and default are equal in
the raw and adjusted data. Finally, we construct investment data /„_t by multiplying the
measured investment/income ratios (/nt/V'nt) by the newly constructed income data Y-n^t-
4.2 Returns on Investment
i
In principle, income growi^h and investment data should tell us something about the return
on investment, R. In practice, however, the parameter cannot be well estimated because
investment data itself is endogenous to current income, and also because investment occurs
relativelj' infrequently. We instead use data on physical assets rather than investment, and
we calibrate R to match cross-sectional relationship between assets and income.
To separate the effect of assets and labor quality on income, we assume that all human
capital investments are made prior to investments in physical assets. Let t — J, indicate
the first year of investing in physical assets. That is, substituting the law of motion for
permanent income, equation (5), J times recursively into the definition of actual income,
equation (4), jdelds;
J
Ut + R E^-^^^-^nL^^
Lj=i
k=i -^'-^
Ut
income of mvestinent prior to t~J
income from investment after t— J
The first term captures income from the early human capital investments, which we
measure by imputing wage income from linear regressions of wages on household charac-
teristics (sex, age, education, region). The second term involves the return R multiplied
by the some of the past J years of investments (weighted by the deterministic and random
components of growth.) We measure this term using current physical assets. That is, R is
calibrated using the following operational formula:
£r = ^t " imputed labor income^ — R (physical assetsj
We have the additional issue of how to deal with the value of housing and unused land.
Neither source of assets contributes to V;, so we would ideally exclude them from the stock
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of assets. ^'^ Using data on the (a) value of the home, (b) value of the plot of land including
the home, and (c) the value of unused or community use land, we construct three variants
of physical assets.
We use a separate data set, the Townsend Thai Monthly Survey, to calibrate this
return. The data is obtained from different villages, but the same overall survey area, and
the monthly has the advantage of including wage data used to impute the labor income
portion of total income.
We us a procedure which is analogous to GMM. We choose R to set the average sr
to zero in the sample of households. The baseline value (which excludes categories (a)-
(c) from assets) yields R = 0.11, while including (c), or (b) and (c), yield R = 0.08 and
R = 0.04, respectively. If we choose R to solve e/j = for each household, then the median
R values are identical to our estimates. Not surprisingly, R substantially varies across
households, however. This is likely due in part because permanent shock histories and
current transitory shocks differ across households, but also in part because households face
different ex ante returns to investment.
4.3 Method of Simulated Moments
In estimating, we introduce multiplicative measurement error in income which we assume
is log normally distributed with zero log mean and standard deviation as- Since liquidity
Lt is calculated using current income, measurement error will also produce measurement
error in liquidity. -
We therefore have eleven remaining parameters 9 = {r, G, ct/v, cr^, erg, c, /?, p, /i,, a^js} ,
which are estimated using a Method of Simulated Moments. The model parameters are
identified jointly by the full set of moments. We include, however, an intuitive discussion
of the specific moments that are particularly important for identifying each parameter.
23 Our measure of Yt does not include imputed owner occupied rent.
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The first two types of moments help identify the return to Hquid savings, r :
es{X,r) = EARNED_INTt-rSt-i
'
- Scr{X,r) = OWED_INTt-rCRt-i ^ -
,
"
-'
In £s, St-i is liquid savings in the previous year, while EARNED_INTt is interest income
received on this savings. Likewise, in Ect-, CR is outstanding short-term credit in the
previous year, and OWED_INT is the subsequent interest owed on this short-term credit
in the following year."'^
The remaining moments require solving for consumption, C{Lt, Pt, I^; 6) — Ptc{lt, i^; 0),
investment decisions, Dj{Lt, Pt, /j"; 9) — dj{lt, i^; 9), and default decisions, D^efiLt, Pt',6) =
ddef {U'i9) , where we have now explicitly denoted the dependence of policy functions on
the parameter set 9. We observe data on decisions, Ct, It, Ddej,t, and states Lt and Yt-
Our strategy is to use these policy functions to define deviations of actual variables (policy
decisions and income growth) from the corresponding expectations of these variables con-
ditional on Lt and Ij."^ By the Law of Iterated Expectations, these deviations are zero in
expectation and therefore valid moment conditions. With simulated moments, we calculate
these conditional expectations by drawing series of shocks for [/(, A^^, i', and measurement
error for a large sample, simulating, and taking sample averages. Details are available upon
request. .
•
.
The income growth moments help to identify the income process parameters and are
derived from the definition of income and the law of motion for permanent income, equa-
tions (4) and (5)."'' Average income growth helps identify the drift component of growth
income growth, G:
E, {Lt, Yt, Yt+^; 9) = In {Yt+./Y) - E [In [Yt+^/Y) |L„ 7,]
^"'In the data there are many low interest loans, and the average difference between households interest
rates on short term borrowing and saving is small, just 2 percent.
^^Since L( requires the previous years savings St~i, these moments are not available in the first year.
"^Carroll and Samwick (1997) provide techniques for estimating the income process parameters G, cri\j,
and au without solving the policy function. These techniques cannot be directly applied in our case,
however, since income is depends on endogenous investment decisions.
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The variance of income growth over different horizons {k =1...3-year growth rates, respec-
tively) helps identify standard deviation of transitory and permanent income shocks, cju
and a^, since transitory income shocks add the same amount of variance to income growth
regardless of horizon k, whereas the variance contributed by permanent income shocks in-
creases with k. The standard deviation of measurement error ge will also play a strong
role in measured income growth. The deviations are defined as:
r ]n(Y,.JYA 1
^v,k{Lt,Yt,Yt^k]0) =
I rtW^t)
-E[lniYt+,/Yt)\Lr,Yt]
-E
for fc = 1,2,3
ln{Yt,^,/Yt)
-E[ln{Yt+,/Yt)\Lt,Yt]
-, 2
Lt,Yt
We identify minimum consumption, c; the investment project size distribution parameters,
fj.^
and af, the preference parameters /3 and p, and the variance of measurement error a^ us-
ing moments on consumption decisions, investment decisions, and the size of investments.
Focusing on both investment probability and investment size should help in separately
identifying the mean (/Zj) and standard deviation ((7^) of the project size distribution. Fo-
cusing on deviations in log consumption, investment decisions, and log investments (when
investments are made): ' . • ,
-
'
ec{Ct,LuYt-0) = Ct-E[Ct\LuYt] ]''''''
^ --
- eDiDr,t,Lt,Y,;e) = Dj,t - E [Di,t\Lt,Yt]
.,
,
ei{Di^tJuLuYue) = Duh - E[Dj,j;\L,,Yt],
we are left with essentially three moment conditions for five parameters:
E[sc]^0 E[6d] = E[6j] =
However, we gain additional moment conditions by realizing that since these deviations are
conditional on income and liquidity, their interaction with functions of income and liquidity
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should also be zero in expectation. Omitting the functional dependence of these deviations,
we express below the remaining six valid moment conditions:
^ . ,
-
, : E[sc\nYt]=Q E\eD\nYt\=Q E[ei\nYt] = Q :••
E\ec {L,IY^)\ = E[eD {Lt/Y,)] = E[e, {Lt/Y,)] =
Intuitively, in expectation, the model should match average log consumption, probabil-
ity of investing, and log investment across all income and liquidity levels, e.g., not over-
predicting at low income or liquidity levels, while underpredicting at high levels. These
moments play particular roles in identifying measurement error shocks ue and c, in partic-
ular. If the data shows less response of these pohcy variables to income then predicted, that
could be due to a high level of measurement error in income. Similarly, high consumption
at low levels of income and liquidity in the data would indicate a high level of minimum
consumption c.
Finally, given c, default decision moments are used to identify the borrowing constraint
s, which can be clearly seen from equation (10):
Sdef {Lt,Yt, Ddefj) = Ddef,t — E[Ddef,t\Lt,Yt]
In total, we have 16 moments to estimate 11 parameters.
4.4 Estimation Results
Table 2 presents the estimation results for the structural model as well as some measures of
model fit. The interest rate r (0.054) is midway between the average rates on credit (0.073)
and savings (0.035), and is quite similar to the six percent interest rate typically charged
by village funds. The estimated discount factor 3 (0.915) and elasticity of substitution p
(1.16) are within the range of usual values for bufferstock models. The estimated standard
deviations of permanent cta' (0.31) and transitory ay (0.42) income shocks are about twice
those for wage earners in the United States (see Gourinchas and Parker, 2002), but reflect
the higher level of income uncertainty of predominantly self-employed households in a rural,
developing economy. In contrast, the standard deviation of measurement error as (0.15)
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is much smaller than that of actual transitory income shocks, and is the only estimated
parameter that is not significantly different from zero. The average log project size jl^
greatly exceeds the average size of actual investments (i.e., log h/Yt) in the data (1.47
vs. -1.96), and there is a greater standard deviation in project size ct, than in investments
in the data (2.50 vs. 1.22). In the model, these difference between the average sizes of
realized investment and potential projects stem from the fact that larger potential projects
are much less likely to be undertaken. ^^ The estimated borrowing constraint parameter |
indicates that agents could borrow up to about 8 percent of their annual permanent income
as short-term credit in the baseline period. (In the summary statistics of Table 1, credit
averages about 20 percent of annual income, but liquid savings net of credit, the relevant
measure, is actually positive and averages 9 percent of income.) The value of c indicates
consumption in default is roughly half of the permanent component of income.
Standard errors on the model are relatively small. We attempt to shed light on the im-
portance of each of the 16 moments to identification of each the 11 parameters, but this is
not trivial to show. Let e be the (16-by-l) vector of moments and W, the (16-by-16) sym-
metric weighting matrix, then the criterion function is e'We and the variance-covariance
matrix is [e' We] " . The minimization condition for the derivative of the criterion function
is then 2e'W|| = 0. Table 3 presents ||, a 16-by-ll matrix showing the sensitivity of each
moment to any given parameter. The infiuence of the parameter on the criterion function
involves 2£'W, which has both positive and negative elements, however . Hence, the mag-
nitudes of the elements in Table 3 very substantially across parameters and moments. W
is also not a simple diagonal matrix so that the parameters are jointly identified. Some
moments are strongly affected by many parameters (e.g., income growth and variances),
while some parameters have strong effects on many moments (e.g., r, G, and /?).
Still, the partial derivatives confirm the intuition above, in that the moments play a
role in pinning down the parameters we associate with them. In particular, the interest
rate r is the only parameter in the interest moments (rows £s and Ecr)- While ajv is
^'^In the model, the average standard deviation of log investment (when investment occurs) is 1.37, close
to the 1.22 in the data.
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relatively more important for the variance of two and three-year growth rates (rows e\/2
and cv',3), CTy is important for the variance of one-year growth rates (row Sv,i)- cte has
important effects on the variance of income growi^h (rows ev^.i, £y,2 and £1/3), but also the
interaction of consumption and investment decisions with Y [ec * InF, ed * InF, and
£/ * \nY) and L/Y (rows sc * L/Y , sd * L/Y, and Sj * L/Y). (These moments are even
more strongly affected by r, aj^, G, P, and p, however.) The utility function parameters
P and p have the most important effect on consumption and investment moments (rows
£c-c/.L/y-). Also, while /Zj and a^ also affect income growth variance (rows eyj, sv,2 and
ev'.s), the investment probability and investment level moments (rows eo-e/ * L/Y) also
help identify them. Finally, both s and c affect default similarly, but have opposite-signed
effects on the interaction of measured income and liquidity ratios with investment (rows
£-£)*lny", £d*L/Y, ei*\nY, and sj* L/Y) and, especially, consumption (rowsec^lny and
£c * L/Y) decisions.
In terms of fit, the model does well in reproducing average default probability, con-
sumption, investment probability and investment levels (presented in Table 2), and indeed
deviations are uncorrelated with log income or liquidity ratios. Still, we can easily reject
the overidentifying restrictions in the model, which tells us that the model is not the real
world. The large J-statistic in the bottom-right of Table 2 is driven by two sets of mo-
ments."* First, the estimation rejects that the savings and borrowing rates are equal. ^^
Second, the model does poorly in replicating the volatility of the income growth process,
yielding too little volatility.
We suspect this is the result of the income process and our statistical procedures failing
'^^The J-statistic is the number of households (720) times e'We. Since, W is symmetric, we can rewrite
this as e'e. The major elements of the summation i'i are 0.02 [Ss), 0.02 (scr), 0.03 (ei,,i), 0.04 (£t,,2),
while the others are all less than 0.01.
^®It would be straightforward to allow for different borrowing and saving rates. This would lead to
a kink in the budget constraint, however. The effect would that one would never observe simultaneous
borrowing and saving and there would be a region where households neither save nor borrow. In the data,
simultaneous short-term borrowing and saving is observed in 45 percent of observations, while having
neither savings nor credit is observed in only 12 percent.
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to adequately capture cyclical effects of income growth, in particular the Thai financial crisis
and recovery of 1997 and 1998 (survey years 1998 and 1999, respectively). Only mean time-
varying volatility is extracted from the data using our regression techniques, but the crisis
presumably affected the variance as well.'^" Excluding the crisis from the pre-sample is not
possible, since it would leave us just one year of income growth to identify both transitory
and permanent income shocks. An alternative estimation that uses only data from 2000
and 2001, except for 1999 data used to create two-year income growth variance moments,
produced estimates with wide standard errors that were not statistically different from the
estimates above. The only economically significant difference was a much lower borrowing
constraint (I = —0.25), which is consistent with an expansion of credit observed in the
Thai villages even pre-intervention. Recall that this trend is not related to village size,
however.
Another way of evaluating the within-sample fit of the model is to notice that it is com-
parable to what could be obtained using a series of simple linear regressions estimating 1
1
coefficients (rather than 11 parameters estimated by the structural model). By construc-
tion, the nine moments defined on consumption, investment probability, and investment
levels could be set equal to zero by simply regressing each on a constant, log income, and
liquidity ratios. This would use nine coefficients. The two remaining coefficients could sim-
ply be linear regressions of growth and default on constant terms (i.e., simple averages).
These linear regressions would exactly match the eleven moments that we only nearly fit.
On the other hand, these linear predictors would predict no income growth volatility, and
would have nothing to say about the interest on savings and credit. '
So the result on the fit of the model are mixed. However, we view the model's ability
to make policy predictions on the impact of credit as a stronger basis for evaluating its
usefulness. We consider this in the next section.
''"We know from alternative estimation techniques that the model does poorly in matching year-to-year
fluctuations in variables. In the estimation we pursue, we construct moments for consumption, investment,
etc., that are based only on averages across the four years. For income growth volatitility, the moments
necessarily have a year-specific component.
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5 Million Baht Fund Analysis
This section introduces the MiUion Baht fund intervention into the model, examines the
model's predictions relative to the data, presents a normative evaluation of the program,
and then presents alternative analyses using the structural model.
5.1 Relaxation of Borrowing Constraints
We incorporate the injection of credit into the model as a surprise decrease in s.^^. That
is, for each of sLxty four villages, indexed by v, we calibrate the new, reduced constraint
under the million baht fund intervention s^'' as the level for which our model would pre-
dict one million baht of additional credit relative to the baseline at s. We explain this
mathematically below.
Define first the expected borrowing of a household n with the Million Baht Fund inter-
vention:
^ [^n,t,v\^n,t, in,t,Sy
mbl Ell.<o
-D,[LuPuIt;s^')i;
\Ln,t, 1 n,t
and in the baseline without the intervention:
E [Bn,t,v\Ln,t, yn,t\s] = E < J<o
Lt-C{Lt,Pt.j;;s)
-D,[LuPui;;s)I*
\^n,ti J n,\
where X<o is shorthand notation for the indicator function that the bracketed expression
is negative (i.e., borrowing and not savings). On average, village funds lent out 950,000
baht in the first year, so we choose s^'' so that we would have hypothetically predicted an
'^Microfinance is often viewed as a lending technology innovation which is consistent with the reduction
in s. An alternative would be to model the expansion of credit through a decrease in the interest rate on
borrowing, but recall that we did not measure a decline in short-term interest rates in response to the
program.
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additional 950,000 baht of borrowing in each village in the pre-intervention data ^~:
±f-i E [B^lJK^Yn^uS^"] 1 ^ 950,000
AT^I -E[B^,t,v\Lr.,uYr,,t;s]
J
# HHs in village.
Here M represents the number of surveyed households in the pre-intervention data.
The resulting s^'' values average -0.28 across the villages, with a standard deviation
of 0.14, a minimum of -0.91 and a maximum of -0.09. Hence, for most villages, the post-
program ability to borrow is substantial relative to the baseline (s = —0.08), averaging
about one-fifth of permanent income after the introduction of the program. '^'^
5.2 Predictive Power
Using the calibrated values of borrowing limits, we evaluate the model's predictions for 2002
and 2003 (i.e., t = Q and 7) on five dimensions: log consumption, probability of investing,
log investment levels, default probability, and income growth. Using the observed liquidity
(Ln^s) and income data (Ki.s) for year five (i.e., 2001), the last pre-intervention year, we draw
series of Un,t, Nn,t, inf a'^'^ measurement error shocks from the estimated distributions,
and simulate the model for 2002 and 2003. We do this 500 times, and combine the data
with the actual pre-intervention data, in order to create 500 artificial datasets.
We then ask whether reduced-form regressions would produce similar impact estimates
using simulated data as they would using the actual post-intervention data, even though
statistically the model is rejected. We do not have a theory of actual borrowing from the
village fund, so rather than instrumenting for village fund credit, we put „ HHif^n^vma e ' ^^^
average injection per household, directly into the outcome equations in place of predicted
'^Since 1999 is the base year used, the 950,000 baht is deflated to 1999 values. Predicted results are
similar if we use the one million baht which might have been predicted ex ante.
^''These large changes are in line with the size of the intervention, however. In the smallest village, the
ratio of program funds to village income in 2001 is 0.42. If half the households borrow, this would account
for the 0.83 drop in s.
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village fund credit. The following reduced form regressions are then: ,,
Y^ 950,000
=6,7
''# HHs in village/
'
'
' '
r^ sr^ 950,000
'-"-,..
Dn,t = / «Dj „ TTTT
—
T^ ^t=j + "D,t + eD,n,t^ -^ # HHs in Village^ ^ ' ' , :.
: - V-- : 950,000 ^
^
'
-
,
,
V
^ti^r
'# HHs m Village,, ,_ , •
Y^ 950,000
^.^
'' # HHs in Village^ '' :
V^ 950,000
j=6,7 "" ° '^
Here Qcj' ^d,j, o:jj, ctoEFj, and aAinVj would be estimates of the year j impact of the
program on consumption, investment probability, average investment, default probability,
and log income grov.'th, respectively. Beyond replacing village fund credit {VFCRn^t) and
its first-stage regression with
^^^ .^'^ village '
^^® above equations differ from the motivating
regressions, equation (2), in two other ways. First, impact coefficients q^j are now vary
by year j . Second, the regressions above omit the household level controls and household
fixed-effects, but recall Section 4.1.1, where we filtered the data of variation correlated
with household level demographic data. We also filtered year-to-year variation out of the
pre-program data, so the year fixed effects will be zero for the pre-program years. For the
post-program years, however, the year fixed-effects will capture the aggregate effect of the
program as well els any cyclical component not filtered out of the the actual post-program
data. We run these regressions on both the simulated and actual data and compare the
estimates and standard errors.
'
Table 4 compares the regression results of the model to the data, and shows that the
model does generally quite well in replicating the results, particularly for consumption,
investment probability, and investment.
The top panel presents the estimates from the actual data. These regressions yield
the surprisingly high, and highly significant, estimates for consumption of 1.39 and 0.90
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in the first year and second year, respectively. The estimate on investment probability
is significant and positive, but only in the first year. For a village, with the average
village fund credit per household of 9600, the point estimate of 6.3e-6 would translate into
an increase in investment probabiHty of sbc percentage points. Nonetheless, and perhaps
surprising in a world without lumpy investment, the regressions find no significant impact on
investment, and very large standard errors on the estimates. The impact efTects on default
are significant, but negative in the first year and positive in the second year reflecting
transitional dynamics. Finally, the impact of the program on log income growth is positive
and significant, but only in the second year. Again, given the average village fund credit
per household, this coefficient would translate into a ten percentage point higher growth
rate in the second year.
The second panel of Table 4 presents the regressions using the simulated data. The
first row shows the average (across 500 samples) estimated coefficient and the second row
shows the average standard error on these estimates. The main point is that the estimates
in the data are typical of the estimates the model produces for consumption, investment
probability, and investment. In particular, the model yields a large and significant estimate
of the coefficient on consumption that is close to one in the first year, and a smaller though
still large estimate in the second year. The standard errors are also quite similar to what is
observed. The model also finds a comparably sized significant coefficient on the investment
probabilities, although its average coefficients are more similar in both the first and second
years, whereas the data show a steep drop off in the magnitude and significance after the
first year.
:.
The model's predictions for default and income volatility growi;h are less aligned with
the data. For default, both the model and data show a marked and significant decrease
in default in the first year, though the model's is much larger. Wliile the data show a
significant increase in default in the second year, the model produces no effect. '''^ The data
also shows a significant increase in income growth in the second year, whereas regressions
For the alternative definition of default, where all loans not from relatives with an unstated duration
are considered in default, the data actually show a small decrease in the second year.
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from the model measure no impact on income growth. Perhaps, both of these shortcomings
are results of the model's inability to fully capture year to year fluctuations in the volatility
of the income growth process in the estimation. ' ' '
The final panel shows formally that the estimates from the model are statistically similar
to those in the data. It shows the fraction of simulations in which a Chow test on a sample
with both the actual and simulated data for the post-program years finds a structural break
at a 5 percent level of significance. Such occurrences are quite rare. Except for investment
levels, where outliers can drive results, structural breaks are found at a rate comparable to
the level of significance. - ' -
One further note is that while the impact coefficients in the data are quite similar
to those in the simulated structural model, they differ substantially from what would be
predicted using reduced form regressions. For example, if we added credit (CRnj) as a
right-hand side variable in a regression on consumption, a reduced form approach might
use the coefficient (say 5i) on credit to predict the per baht impact of the village fund
credit injection. That is, we might predict a change in consumption of 6i „ ^-^^^^ y°;^^ ^ •
However, in the following regression: •
, ,
# HHs m village^
an F-test does indeed reject that 5i = So- Parallel regressions that replace credit with
consumption, investment probability, or default also reject this restriction, and these re-
strictions are also rejected if credit is replaced with liquidity or income.
In sum, we measure large average effects on consumption and insignificant effects on
investment, but the structural model helps us in quantitatively interpreting these impacts.
First, these average coefficients mask a great deal of unobserved heterogeneity. Consider
Figure 3 which shows the estimated policy function for consumption (normalized by per-
manent income) c as a function of (normalized) project size i* and (normalized) liquidity
/. Again, the cliff-like drop in consumption running diagonally through the middle of the
graph represents the threshold level of liquidity that induces investment. In the simula-
tions, households in a village are distributed along this graph, and the distribution depends
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on the observables {Y and L), and stochastic draws of the shocks (i* and U, since P —
^).
We have plotted examples of five potential households, all of whom could appear ex
ante identical in terms of their observables, Y and L. (i.e., their state) constant, but
resembles a leftward shift in the graphed decision (recall Figure 2, panel B). A small
decrease in s can yield qualitatively different responses to the five households labeled.
Household I's income is lower than expected, and so would respond to small decrease in s
by borrowing to the limit and increasing consumption. Household II is a household that
had higher than expected income. Without the intervention, the household invests and is
not constrained in its consumption. Given the lower s, it does not borrow, but nevertheless
increases its consumption. Given the lower borrowing constraint in the future, it no longer
requires as large a bufferstock today. Household III, though not investing, will similarly
increase consumption without borrowing by reducing its bufferstock given a small decrease
in s. Thus, in terms of consumption, Household I-HI would increase consumption, and
Households II and III would do so without borrowing. If these households were the only
households, the model would dehver the surprising result that consumption increases more
than credit, but Households IV and V work against this. Household IV is a household
in default. A small decrease in s would have no affect on its consumption or investment,
but simply increase the indebtedness of the household and reduce the amount of credit
that would have been defaulted. Finally, Household V is perhaps the target household of
microcredit rhetoric a small increase in credit would induce the household to invest. But
if (as drawn) the household would invest in a sizable project, it would finance this by not
only increasing its borrowing but also by reducing its current consumption. One can also
see that the effects of changes in s are not only heterogeneous, but also nonlinear. For
example, if the decrease in s were large enough relative to i*, Household V would not only
invest but also increase consumption.
Quantitatively, draws from the distributions of i* and U (together with the empirical
distribution of L/Y) determine the scattering of households in each village across Figure
3. The high level of transitory income growth volatility lead to a high variance in U,
hence a diffuse distribution in the L/P dimension (given L/Y). There are a substantial
39
number of defaulters in the baseline data, but the changes in s lead to fewer defaulters
(like Household IV) and more hand-to-mouth consumers (like Household I). Similarly, the
low investment probability but sizable average investment levels in the data lead to high
estimated mean and variance of the i* distribution. Given these estimates, most households
in the model have verj' large projects (with a log mean of 6.26), but investment is relatively
infrequent (11.6 percent of observations in the model and data). The median investment
is 14 percent (22 percent) of annual income in the data (model), so that most investments
are relatively small, but these constitute only 4 percent (8 percent) of all investment in
the data (model). '^^ In contrast, a few very large i* investments (e.g., a large truck or a
warehouse) have large effects on overall investment levels. For example, the top percentile
of investments accounts for 36 percent (24 percent) of all investment in the data (model).
Hence, while some households lie close enough to the threshold that changes in s induce
investment, the vast majority of these investments are small. At high levels of i*, the density
of households lying just left of the threshold is relatively small. That is, few households
resemble Household V.
Since a lower s can never reduce investment, the theoretical effect of increased liquidity
on investment levels is clear. It is simply that the samples are too small to measure
it. Given enough households, a small amounts of credit available will eventually decide
whether a ver}' large investment is made or not, and this will occurs more often the larger
the decrease in s. Indeed, when the 500 samples are pooled together, the pooled estimates
of 0.40 (standard error=0.04) for
-]'j 2002 is highly significant. The estimate is also sizable.
Given the average credit injection per household, this would be an increase in investment
of 3800 baht per household (relative to a pre-sample average of 4600 baht/household).
^^.^n alternative interpretation of the data is that most households do not have potential projects that
are of the relevant scale for microfinance. Households with unrealistically large projects may correspond,
in the real world, to households that simply have no potential project in which to invest.
40
5.3 Normative Analysis
We evaluate the benefits of the Million Baht program by comparing its benefits to a simple
liquidity transfer. As our analysis of Figure 3 indicates reductions in s (leftward shifts in
the policy function from the Million Baht program) are similar to increases in liquidity
(rightward shifts in the households from the transfer). Both provide additional liquidity.
The advantage of the Million Baht program is that it provides more than a million
baht in potential liquidity (— (s^*" — £) P). That is, (by construction) borrowers choose
to increase their credit by roughly a million baht, but non-borrowers also benefit from the
increased potential liquidity from the relaxed borrowing constraint in the future. More
generally, those that borrow have access to a disproportionate amount of liquidity relative
to what theyvv' ould get if the money were distributed equally as transfers.
The disadvantage of the Million Baht program is that it provides this liquidity as credit,
and hence there are interest costs which are substantial given r = 0.054. A household that
receives a transfer of, say, 10,000 baht earns interest on that transfer relative to a household
that has access to 10,000 baht in credit, even if it can be borrowed indefinitely.
The relative importance of these two differences depends on household's need for liq-
uidity. Consider again the household in Figure 3. Household II and III, who are not locally
constrained (i.e., their marginal propsensity to consumer is less than one), benefit little
from a marginal decrease in s, since they have no need for it in the current period, and
may not need it for quite some time. Households IV, who is defaulting, is actually hurt
by a marginal reduction in s, since the household will now hold more debt, and be forced
to pay more interest next period. On the other hand. Households I and V benefit greatly
from the reduction in s, since both are locally constrained, in consumption and investment
respectively. .
A quantitative cost benefit analysis is done by comparing the cost of the program (the
reduction in s) to a transfer program (an increase in /) that is equivalent in terms of
providing the same expected level of utility (given L^f and Yn,t in 2001, just before the
program is introduced). That is, we solve the equivalent transfer T„ for each household
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using the following equation: -
E [K(L, p, r ; sf ) |y„,5,., L„,5,„] =£;[K(L + T„,p,r; 5) |y„,5,.,L„,5,.] ' „
The average equivalent liquidity transfer per household in the sample is just 8200 baht
which is about twenty percent less than the 10,100 baht per household that the Million Baht
program cost.'^^ Again, this average masks a great deal of heterogeneity across households,
even in expectation. Ten percent of households value the program at 19,500 baht or more,
while another ten percent value the program at 500 baht or less. 28 percent of households
value the program at more than its cost (10,100 baht), but the median equivalent transfer
is just 5900 baht. Thus, many households benefit disproportionately from the program
because of the increased availability of liquidity, but most benefit much less. Although
the Million Baht program is able to offer the typical household more liquidity (e.g., in the
median village, (— (s^^ — s) P) =13,400 baht for a household with average income, while
the average cost per household in that village is 9100 baht), this benefit is swamped b}^ the
interest costs to households. ^
5.4 Alternative Structural Analyses
The structural model allows for several alternative analyses including comparison with
reduced form predictions, robustness checks with respect to the return on investment i?,
estimation using post-intervention data, long run predictions and policy counterfactuals.
We briefly summarize the results here, but details are available upon request.
5.4.1 Return on Investment
Our baseline value of R was 0.11. Recall that two alternative calibrations of the return
on assets were calculated based on the whether our measure of productive assets included
uncultivated or community use land {R = 0.08) or the value the plot of land containing
the home {R = 0.04). We redid both the estimation and simulation using these alternative
'^This includes only the seed fund, and omits any administrative or monitoring costs of the village banks.
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values. For R = 0.08, the estimates were quite similar;, only a higher /3 (0-94), a lower
r (0.032); and a lower risk aversion (1.12) were statistically different than the baseline.
The model had even more difficulty matching income growth and volatility, so that the
overall fit was substantially worse (J-statistic=200 vs. 113 in the baseline). The simulation
regression estimates were nearly identical. For the low value of i? = 0.04, the estimation
required that the return on liquidity be substantially lower than in the data (r = 0.018) , and
that P be substantially higher (0.97) than typical for bufferstock models. The fit was also
substantially worse (J-statistic=324). Finally, the regression estimates on the simulated
data were qualitatively similar but smaller (e.g., a consumption coefficient of 0.68 in the
first year.) Indeed, only the reduction of default in the first year was statistically significant
at a 0.05 percent level.
5.4.2 Estimation Using Ex Post Data
In this analysis, rather than use the post-intervention data to test the model using calibrated
borrowing constraints, we use it to estimate the new borrowing constraints and better
identify the other parameters in the model. We proceed by specifying a reasonably flexible
but parametric function for s„^(, in the post-program years:
-'"''•^"-^ "^-2 UhHs in village,,
where Sj, $2, and s^ are the parameters of interest.'^'' Third, for the post-program years,
we add additional year-specific moments for income growth and income growth volatility;
consumption, investment probability, investment, and their interactions with measured
income and liquidity ratios; and default. In total, the estimation now includes 41 moments
and 14 parameters.
The estimated results from the full sample are strikingly similar to the baseline esti-
mates from the pre-program sample and the cahbration from the post-program sample, all
If all households borrowed every period and had identical permanent income, then the extra borrowing
per household (950,000/# HHs in village^,) would translate into borrowing constraints with s-^ = s (the
pre-intervention borrowing constraint), s^ = —
-k— , and S3 = 1.
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with two standard deviation bands.'^^ The resulting estimates are Sj = —0.18, §2 — —46,
and I3 = —1.17. The model fit is comparable to the baseline, performing well along the
same dimensions and not well at all along the same dimensions. Finally, the average,
standard deviation, minimmn and maximum of s„^i,„ implied by the estimates are -0.39 (-
0.28 in baseline calibration), -0.19 (-0.14), -1.04 (-0.91), and -0.18 (-0.09) respectively. The
correlation between the two approaches one by construction, since both increase monoton-
ically with village size. That is, the estimated s^j ^ are quite similar to the calibrated
values, except that they are shifted down by roughly 0.1. This is not particularly surpris-
ing since time-specific fixed effects for the latter years were not taken out, and we know
that the model had difficulty matching year-to-year fluctuations. For example, consump-
tion in all villages was high in 2002 and 2003, and so the estimation wants to fit a lower
borrowing constraint. Nonetheless, the fact that the estimates and calibrated values are
otherwise quite close indicates that cross-sectionally the simulated predictions of the model
on average approximate a best fit to the variation in the actual data.
5.4.3 Long Run Predictions
The differences between azj estimates in the first and second year (i.e., j — 1,2) of the
program indicate that impacts are time-varying, since there are transitional dynamics as
households approach desired bufferstocks. The structural model allows for simulation and
longer run horizon estimates of impact. We therefore simulate datasets that include five
additional years of data and run the analogous regressions. Seven years out, none of the
azj estimates are statistically significant on average. Wliile the average point estimates
are quite small for investment probability (0.23), investment (0.10), and default probabil-
ity (0.01) relative to the first year, the average azj for consumption remains substantial
(0.58) and close to the estimate in the second year (0.73). In the model, the impacts on
'^For comparison, the point estimates of the fuh-sample (basehne) estimation are f = 0.061 (0.054),
cr^' = 0.24 (0.31), ay = 0.42 (0.42), c^e = 0.38 (0.15), G = 1.06 (1.047), c = 0.49 (0.52), /3 = 0.928
(0.926)
, p = 1.17 (1.20), A, = 1-35 (1.47) , a, = 2.70 (2.50) , and | = -0.07 (-0.08).
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consumption fall somewhat after the first year, but there remains a substantial persistent
effect. Still, alternative regression estimates that simply measure a single (common for all
post-program years j) coefficient az do not capture any statistically significant impact on
consumption in when seven years of long run data are used. This shows the importance of
considering the potential time-varying nature of impacts in evaluation.
5.4.4 Policy Counterfactual
From the perspective of policymakers, the Million Baht Village Fund Program may appear
problematic along two fronts. Its most discernible impacts are on consumption rather than
investment, and it appears less cost-eff'ective than a simple transfer mainly because funds
may simply go to prevent default and the increased borrowing limit actually hurts defaulting
households. An alternative policy that one might attempt to implement would be to only
allow borrowing for investment. We would assume that the village can observe investment,
but since money is fungible, it would be unclear whether these investments would have been
undertaken even without the loans, in which case the loans are really consumption loans.
Since defaulting households cannot undertake investments, it would prevent households in
default from borrowing. Nevertheless, such a policy would also eliminate households like
Household I in Figure 3 from borrowing. x ;•
The ability to model policy counterfactuals is another strength of a structural model.
In a model with this particular policy, households face the constraint s^'',aiternative ^^ ^^^
period in which they decide to invest, while facing the baseline s if they decide not to
invest. The default threshold is also moved to s^''^"-^ternauve ^ however, to prevent households
from investing and borrowing in one period, and then purposely not investing in the next
period in order to default. Under this policy, the new borrowing constraints are even lower
(averaging -0.67 vs. -0.28 in the actual pohcy) but only for those who borrow. The new
range of borrowing constraints is from -0.16 to -4.78. .,.",.
The policy increases both the impact on consumption and increase the impact on in-
vestment. Pooling all 500 simulated samples yields a significant estimate for consumption
that is similar to the actual million baht intervention (1.40 vs. 1.38 in the first year). It
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also yields a much larger and significant estimate for investment levels (0.62 in the first
year) . Clearly, the counterfactual policy channels funds only to investors and so it is able to
relax borrowing constraints much more substantially for investors, and in turn to help with
large investments but relaxes the borrowing constraint even more for investing households
than the actual policy. Finally, the negative impact on default no longer exists. Although
this policy offers less flexibility for constrained households who would rather not invest,
the benefits are larger to defaulters and investors help outweigh some of this loss. There is
much more variation in the benefits across households (e.g., the standard deviation of the
equivalent transfer is 14,000 baht in this counterfactual vs. 11,000 in the baseline policy),
but the average equivalent transfer is actually lower (7500 vs. 8200). ' ;
6 Conclusions
We have developed a model of bufferstock saving and indivisible investment, and used it
to evaluate the impacts of the Million Baht program as a quasi-experiment. The correct
prediction of consumption increasing more than one for one with the credit injection is a
"smoking gun" for the existence of credit constraints, and is strong support for the impor-
tance of bufferstock savings behavior. Nevertheless, the microfinance intervention appears
to be less cost effective on average than a simpler transfer program because it saddles
households with interest payments. This masks considerable heterogeneity, however, in-
cluding some households that gain substantially. Finally, we have emphasized the relative
strengths of a natural experiment, a structural model, and reduced form regressions.
One limitation of the model is that although project size is stochastic, the quality of
investments, modeled through R, is assumedconstant across projects and households. In
the data, R varies substantially across households. Heterogeneity in project quality may
be an important dimension for analysis, especially since microfinance may change the com-
position of project quality. The process for project sizes was also extremely stylized. Also,
potential projects may be arrive less often, be less transient (which allows for important
anticipatory savings behavior as in Buera, 2008), and multiple projects may be ordered by
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their profitability. Such extensions might help explain the gap between positive predicted
impacts on investment probability, but no impact in the data.
Related, the analysis has also been purely partial equilibrium analysis of household
behavior. Wliile we have emphasized heterogeneous impacts across households, it may
be possible that even a given relaxation of credit constraints would have heterogeneous
impacts across villages. For example, with a large scale intervention, one might suspect
that general equilibrium effects on income, wage rates, rates of return to investment, and
interest rates on liquidity may be important (see Kaboski and Townsend, 2008). Finally,
we did not consider the potential interactions between villagers or between villages, nor
was the intermediation mechanism explicitly modeled. These are all avenues for future
research.
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